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Abstract: Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are hardware security primitives that are increasingly
being used for authentication and key generation in ICs and FPGAs. For space systems, they are a
promising approach to meet the needs for secure communications at low cost. To this purpose, it is
essential to determine if they are reliable in the space radiation environment. In this work we evaluate
the Total Ionizing Dose effects on a delay-based PUF implemented in SRAM-FPGA, namely a Ring
Oscillator PUF. Several major quality metrics have been used to analyze the evolution of the PUF
response with the total ionizing dose. Experimental results demonstrate that total ionizing dose has a
perceptible effect on the quality of the PUF response, but it could still be used for space applications
by making some appropriate corrections.
Keywords: physical unclonable function; FPGA; total ionizing dose; Co-60 gamma radiation;
ring-oscillator
1. Introduction
Securing sensitive information on low-cost satellite applications has become a major challenge
for the space industry. Typical approaches that include very expensive cryptographic primitives,
non-volatile memory and analogous blocks cannot be afforded in these small space systems. In this
context, commercial Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have turned out to be a good solution
due to their flexibility and cost. Among their many uses, FPGAs can be dedicated to ensuring secure
satellite data.
A popular solution to provide security in resource constrained applications, such as those using
FPGAs, is on-chip Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). PUFs are a very promising security primitive
used for authentication and key generation in IC and FPGAs. These security primitives are based
on the impossibility of creating two physically exactly identical ICs due to the influence of random
and uncontrollable effects during the manufacturing process. These uncontrollable influences leave
measurable random marks on some features which possess the potential to generate encryption keys
directly associated to a device [1]. Thus, PUFs work as an unclonable specific feature that can identify
a circuit, just as a fingerprint can identify a human being. Among the various device properties that
can be used for this purpose, delay-based PUFs deserve special attention due to their straightforward
implementation. A delay-based PUF exploits the delay dependency on the random process variations [2].
Well-known examples of this type of PUF are the Arbiter PUF [3] and the Ring Oscillator PUF [2].
PUFs can be used to solve an important issue related to the generation of secure encryption keys
in satellite communications, removing the necessity for key storage. Nonetheless, as PUF response
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depends on some circuit features that may be affected by the operational conditions; it is important to
assert the suitability of these primitives in harsh environments subjected to ionizing radiation. Ionizing
radiation induces charges in the semiconductor material that can be trapped in the oxide, altering
the electrical characteristics of electronic devices. This effect, known as Total Ionizing Dose (TID),
is cumulative and produces a gradual degradation of major electrical parameters, such as threshold
voltage and leakage current, that can eventually result in device failure at a certain dose. To the best
of our knowledge, the effects of TID in delay-based PUFs have not been studied before. There is one
work that studies the TID effects in a CMOS silicon PUF based on transistor breakdown [4].
In this work, we evaluate the effects of ionizing radiation on a well-known delay-based PUF [2]
implemented in a SRAM-FPGA. To that end, we have performed an extensive test with two different
devices exposed to a radiation source, periodically collecting the PUF response as TID increased.
All the external influences that can affect the PUF response (temperature, humidity, voltage, etc.) were
controlled. Several major quality metrics have been used in order to assess the impact of radiation in
the PUF response.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the RO-PUF under study
and the typical effects of ionizing radiation on SRAM-FPGAs. Section 3 describes the implementation
of the RO-PUF and the TID test setup. Section 4 reports the impact of the ionizing dose on the
RO-PUF. Several metrics are presented and analyzed in this section. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the
conclusions of this work.
2. Background
2.1. Ring Oscillator Based PUF
A Ring Oscillator (RO) is a delay loop that oscillates at a particular frequency. Thanks to its
straightforward implementation in FPGAs, ROs have been widely used in the implementation of secure
primitives such as true random number generator (TRNG). RO-PUFs are delay-based PUFs that use
Challenge-Response scheme as a chip authentication mechanism. A traditional RO-PUF [2] makes use
of many identically laid out ROs to quantify the manufacturing variability. RO oscillation frequencies
depend on (i) fixed conditions established at the design phase (i.e., number of stages, place&route, etc.);
(ii) random process variations (that once manufactured are fixed for each single device); (iii) dynamic
conditions derived from the operation environment (i.e., supply voltage, temperature, surrounding
logic, etc.). Figure 1 depicts the traditional RO-PUF scheme [2] that consists of many identical ROs,
counters and comparators.
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Figure 1. Ring Oscillator Physical Unclonable Function (RO-PUF) general scheme.
During the authentication process, a pair of ROs (selected by a user challenge) are quantized by
measuring and comparing the RO frequencies ( fa, fb) and generating a response bit r:
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r =
{
1 if fa > fb
0 otherwise
(1)
An n-bit signature of the chip is computed from n different comparisons between RO frequencies.
The quality of the PUF is evaluated by analysing the signatures. In most of the literature, major security
metrics like uniformity, reliability and uniqueness are used to assess the PUF quality [5].
• Uniformity is a metric related to the entropy of the system. This metric estimates the ratio of
‘1’ vs. ‘0’ in all the response bits generated by a PUF. The uniformity is computed as follows for
an n-bit PUF response:
Uni f ormity =
1
n
n
∑
l=1
ri,l × 100% (2)
where ri,l is the l-th bit of an n-bit PUF response. An uniform distribution of 0’s and 1’s (50%) is
expected in PUFs that have full entropy.
• Reliability is a metric that quantifies how stable the PUF response is over varying operating
conditions (voltage, temperature, aging, etc.). To that end, a specific challenge is applied to
the RO-PUF in order to obtain an n-bit reference response (ri) for normal conditions (room
temperature, ideal power supply voltage). The same n-bit response is collected at different
operating conditions (r′i). Finally, the reliability is obtained using the Hamming distance (HD)
analysis of responses.
Reliability =
1
x
x
∑
y=1
HD(ri, ri,y ′)
n
× 100% (3)
where x is the number of samples for each condition and ri,y ′ is the y-th sample of (r′i). A lower
value of intra-die HD leads to a higher reliability.
• Uniqueness is a measure of how different the PUF responses of different chips among a set of
chips are. The uniqueness of a population of k-chips is obtained by computing the inter-HD of
the n-bit responses for the same challenge:
Uniqueness =
2
k(k− 1)
k−1
∑
i=1
k
∑
j=i+1
HD(ri, rj)
n
× 100% (4)
where ri and rj are the PUF responses of chips i and j (i 6= j). An ideal uniqueness of 50% is
desired for the complete set of chips.
2.2. TID on SRAM FPGAs
TID effects on SRAM-based FPGAs, including non-radiation hardened, have been widely studied
in recent years [6–8]. TID causes a degradation of the transistors as ionizing radiation accumulates on
the component. This degradation leads to creating trapped charges that will slowly affect the electrical
parameters of the device (threshold voltage (Vth) and leakage current) [9]. In this context, NMOS and
PMOS transistors behave differently. The trapped charges will negatively affect the threshold voltage
increasing the leakage current in NMOS transistors. Conversely, in PMOS transistors the threshold
voltage will be increased and the leakage reduced. In addition, a deterioration of noise parameters
can be observed [10]. All these effects are dependent on many factors such as dose rate, the type of
radiation applied, temperature, etc.
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At device level, an increase of the propagation delay of the circuits instantiated in the FPGA is
the main aspect to consider. Faults can appear when the timing constraints are violated due to this
increment [11].
3. Experimental Setup
3.1. Device Under Test
The radiation experiments have been carried out on two Xilinx XC3S500E FPGA, manufactured on
90 nm CMOS technology. In the remainder of the paper, these Devices Under Test (DUTs) are referred
to as FPGA1 and FPGA2. The clock is set using the on-board 50MHz crystal oscillator. Two high
precision voltage sources (programmable HP 66103A DC power modules) have been used in order to
set and monitor the core voltage (1.2 V) and the I/O voltage (3.3 V).
A conventional RO-PUF consisting of 512 identically laid-out ROs has been implemented. Each
of the ROs consists of four inverters and a NAND gate, the latter being able to enable/disable the
oscillation. A hard macro that occupies one Configurable Logic Block (CLB) has been created in order
to guarantee the same placement and routing for all the ROs. This hard macro has been replicated in
the middle of the FPGA creating a 16 × 32 array. During the experiment, each RO is activated at a
time during 13,000 clock cycles using its enable signal. The rest of the RO-PUF logic (multiplexers,
counters, decoders, etc.) have been implemented in other FPGA zones in order to limit the impact of
the surrounding logic on RO frequencies. An RS232 communication protocol has been used in order to
transfer the measured RO frequencies to the host computer. A CRC has been implemented in order to
ensure the integrity of the communication.
The operating conditions of the room (temperature, pressure and humidity) have been controlled
in order to guarantee that these conditions do not affect the RO frequencies.
3.2. TID Setup
The TID tests have been performed at the RADLAB facility, the Gamma Radiation Laboratory
installed in the Centro Nacional de Aceleradores (CNA), Spain. The RADLAB [12,13] is based on
a Co-60 radioactive source, placed into a Gamma beam X200 irradiator. The average value for the
photons energy is 1.25 MeV, which is usually established for testing purposes.
The irradiator has a conical opening which contains a variable collimator, providing different
square irradiation fields. During a first irradiation setup, the maximum irradiation field was used and
no shielding was applied on the board, so all the components of the PCB were exposed to radiation,
not only the DUT (FPGA). As a consequence, some issues were observed before detecting any effect in
the DUT. For the subsequent campaigns, the irradiation field was reduced to focus the main gamma
beam on the FPGA under study. Moreover, the setup was additionally improved with a custom partial
shielding on the board, significantly decreasing the dose rate on the most sensitive components of the
PCB (Figures 2 and 3 ).
Since the DUT is located in one specific position of the PCB submitted to radiation, a dummy
board was placed for each setup preparation in the same position as the SAMPLE in order to carry out
the dosimetry (Figure 4), that is, to measure the dose rate on the DUT, before starting the irradiation test.
The dosimetry system is composed by a Farmer ionization chamber connected to the UNIDOS
Webline electrometer, both of them by PTW. First air kerma rate is obtained and the dose rate in silicon
(Si) is calculated taking into account the conversion factors. The dose rate uniformity in the radiation
field was better than 95% and the expanded uncertainty associated with the measurement was ±4.2%.
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Figure 2. Shielding of the PCB attached to the cover of the filter box.
Figure 3. Profile view of the shielding between the PCB and the cover of the filter box.
Figure 4. PCB customized to carry out the dosimetry measurements with the reference point of the
ionization chamber placed exactly in the position of the device under test (DUT).
The dosimetry and the irradiation run were performed using a filter box, with the DUT inside,
according to the TID standard from European Space Agency [12]. This container has 1.5 mm Pb (lead)
with an inner lining of 2 mm Al (aluminium). The front cover is made of Al, except in the region close
to the DUT, where the build-up material is polymethilmetacrilate (PMMA). In Figure 5 is depicted the
final setup.
The FPGA1 and FPGA2 were exposed to a total dose of 500 krad(Si), with the dose rates of
5.2 krad(Si)/h and 5.3 krad(Si)/h, respectively.
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Figure 5. Filter Box with the PCB (and DUT) inside and the connections to the different ports and
power supply.
4. Experimental Results and Discussion
This section describes the results of the irradiation experiments on the two DUTs.
4.1. FPGA Parameters and Functionality
The core currents and voltages were continuously measured during the entire experiment.
The pre-irradiation operation currents were measured to be 23.9 mA for FPGA1 and 29.09 mA for
FPGA2. At the end of the experiment [500 krad(Si)], the currents reached 95.97 mA and 83.35 mA,
respectively. These internal core currents are within the limits of the vendor recommendations for this
FPGA (typical: 25 mA; maximum: 106 mA). Nevertheless, the first failure was registered at 410 krad(Si)
in FPGA1. This failure was related to the RS232 communication protocol and a reprogramming of the
FPGA was necessary in order to recover normal functionality. This kind of error was reproduced until
the end of the experiment. In FPGA2, no failures were registered. Both DUTs could not be reconfigured
any more after the deposited dose reached 440 krad(Si). The faulty behaviour that appeared only
in FPGA1 can be explained by the batch difference on the DUT or the lower dose rate (the results
typically show marginally higher dose degradation threshold at lower dose rates [14]).
Figure 6 depicts the core currents of FPGA1 and FPGA2 through the irradiation experiment. It is
noteworthy that for both DUTs the core current increased linearly with the dose. This increase of leakage
current is fully accounted for in the creation of electron-hole pairs due to the ionization of SiO2 [15].
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Figure 6. Internal Core Current vs. radiation.
4.2. Delay Variation of the RO Loop
RO frequencies play a key role in the RO-PUF authentication scheme, therefore they have been
subjected to exhaustive analysis during the whole experiment. For each RO, we have carried out
100 frequency acquisitions in order to improve the measurement error by averaging the values.
At pre-irradiation conditions, the average RO frequencies of FPGA1 and FPGA2 are 196.12 MHz and
199.16 MHz respectively. At the end of the experiment [500 krad(Si)], the average RO frequencies of
FPGA1 and FPGA2 have decreased to 195.1 MHz (0.5%) and 197.92 MHz (0.6%) respectively. Figure 7
shows how the 512 RO average frequencies of FPGA2 changed during the experiment. It can be
appreciated that after a first sharp decrease at 10 krad(Si), all the ROs follow the same tendency. It is
also worthy of note that there are not many intersections between the different lines, which indicates a
good frequency stability. These results are very similar to those reported in [16], where the effects of
ageing in a RO-PUF were studied.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the average frequencies at pre-irradiation conditions and at the
end of the experiment. Once again, the frequency stability can be highlighted. The results for FPGA1
are analogous to those depicted in Figures 7 and 8.
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Figure 7. RO frequencies vs. radiation.
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Figure 8. FPGA2 frequency distribution and scatter plot at pre-irradiation conditions and at 500 krad(Si).
4.3. RO-PUF Quality Factors
We have calculated the main metrics related to PUF quality in order to evaluate the suitability
of the RO-PUF for space applications. To that end, a 511-bit response has been generated for each
accumulated doses. This 511-bit response is extracted by comparing the average frequencies of adjacent
pairs of ROs in the array.
4.3.1. Uniformity
Figure 9 depicts the uniformity of the PUF response during the experiment. For both DUTs,
the response bits are fairly evenly distributed among ‘0’ and ‘1’, showing almost an ideal distribution
throughout the entire experiment. The average number of 1’s in the PUF response for FPGA1 and
FPGA2 are 51.43% and 49.61%, respectively.
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Figure 9. Uniformity vs. radiation.
4.3.2. Reliability
Figure 10 shows the intra-die Hamming distance calculated using Equation (2). The pre-irradiated
511-bit response has been set as the reference response. In both FPGAs, the initial intra-die HD is low
(>3%) and it increases with the accumulated dose. This means that there is an increasing degradation
of the RO performance that is proportional to the radiation dose.
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4.3.3. Uniqueness
Figure 11 presents the inter-die Hamming distance obtained using Equation (3). Once again, a loss
on the uniqueness can be observed and is proportional to the accumulated dose.
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Figure 11. Uniqueness vs. radiation.
4.4. Result Analysis
The increase in the core currents are consistent with other results reported in the literature for the
same FPGA [17]. In the case of FPGA1, the first failure occurred at 410 krad(Si), which is also similar
to the first failure reported in [17], where the DUT worked properly until 345 krad(Si). Regarding the
RO-frequencies, the experiments have shown that there is a good stability on the frequencies and the
changes due to the accumulated dose are negligible.
On the other hand, the quality metrics show that the accumulated dose makes the responses
produced by the PUF unreliable. Nonetheless, as the uniformity metric shows, the randomness of
the response remains unaffected by the total dose. This may be due to the decrease of the noise
parameters that have a direct influence on the randomness. Reliability is the key metric to evaluate
after the deployment of PUFs in space. If at pre-irradiation conditions all the metrics have acceptable
values, only a decrease in the reliability due to ionizing radiation can affect the rest of the metrics.
In this case, the reliability metric shows a little degradation that can be corrected using some typical
countermeasures such as using only RO pairs with maximal frequency difference [2] or using quantizers
with reliability guarantees [18]. Regarding uniqueness, as a collateral effect of unreliability, the results
also show a degradation of the metric.
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All in all, we can conclude that total ionizing dose has a perceptible effect on the quality of the RO-PUF
response. However, with some post-processing, this RO-PUF could be used for space applications.
5. Conclusions
RO-PUFs leverage minor delay variations that exist between devices to support security functions
such as authentication and key generation. As TID significantly affects propagation delays, the response
of an RO-PUF may be jeopardized in space. In this work, we have performed a comprehensive analysis
of the effects of ionizing radiation on the quality of RO-PUFs implemented in FPGAs. RO-PUFs
responses were collected as dose accumulated in order to evaluate uniformity, reliability, uniqueness
and frequency stability. The external environment was controlled and the core currents and voltages
were continuously measured to ensure the results were not biased.
Experimental results showed that RO frequencies show good stability and that the randomness
of the response is not affected by TID. However, the reliability and uniqueness of the response
shows a little degradation. Nevertheless, this degradation can be corrected by using some typical
countermeasures. With these corrections, we can conclude that RO-PUFs implemented in FPGAs can
be used in space applications.
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